A New Approach to Monetary Control October 6, 1979, has become one of those dates which is instantly recognized as being associated with something importantand rightly so. After all, it was the day on which Pope John visit ed Washington, D.C. However, as you and I know, the Pope's visit was not the only extraordinary event occurring in Washington on that fall Sat urday morning. The Federal Open Market Committee had assembled in an extraordinary Saturday session, and at the conclusion of the meeting the Fed announced a series of policy changes which included some "conventional moves," and the Fed also announced a change in the method used to conduct monetary policy. Specifically, the Fed indicated its intent to "place greater emphasis in day-to-day operations on the supply of bank reserves and less emphasis on con fining short-term fluctuations in the federal funds rate." This change in operating procedures-or, to be more pre cise, the change in emphasis in operating procedures-was a recog nition that, because of sudden and unpredictable shifts, the rela tionship between the amount of money demanded and interest rates had weakened. Hitting a specified funds rate target, therefore, provided increasingly less assurances that the corresponding money targets would be hit-even over long periods of time. Aside from the technical issue as to how to best control money, the change in procedures was also intended to draw greater public attention to the notion that one necessary prerequisite to controlling inflation over time rests in achieving disciplined and restrained growth in money and credit. Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Now, more than a year later, it is appropriate that we consider our experience with these new operating procedures, and this forum can play a constructive role in that evaluation. How ever, I cannot help but note that the title of today's forum-"Federal Reserve Policy Since October 1979: Is It Really Dif ferent?"-seems a bit prejudicial. Indeed, as someone who reads the financial press carefully and as someone who spends a fair amount of time talking with people in the markets, I am struck with the skepticism that still exists as to whether, in fact, anything has really changed. By the same token, I am also struck at times by the extent to which other observers, both in the markets and in academic circles, argue that too much has changed. Thus, the focus of my remarks this afternoon will be on my perceptions of the changes that have occurred in our operating techniques. From my vantage point, the fact that something has chang ed is clear. And I think that the evidence of change is beyond dispute. I know that from the nature of the discussions at the meetings of the FOMC; I know that from the language of the Commit tee's directives to the Manager of the System Open Market Account; I know that from the manner in which information is presented to the Committee by the staff and by the manner in which the Committee reacts to the information at its disposal. These inherently immeasurable indications of change are reinforced by indications of change in market variables. Here too, however, the evidence of change is, I believe, convincing. The daily movement in the funds rate was twice as large after October 1979 as it was in a comparable period before then. Likewise, the -Digitized for FRASER http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/ Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis that evaluation and out of the continued evolution of events, and even assuming the best in terms of transitional problems such as the introduction of NOW accounts nationwide, we still, in my mind, have to come to better grips with the question of what kinds of information we react to and how we react. Even in a highly simpli fied world in which we know exactly what "money" is and can measure it precisely from week to week, there will be deviations from tar gets, there will be aberrations, there will be external shocks, and there will be uncertainty. in this context, it seems to me that there is a wide and growing body of knowledge in the area of deci sion rules and information filtering which may be relevant to the task of more systematically determining what is "noise" and what is "real." In summary, there has been a change in the way we conduct monetary policy. The change has not been without its problems, and certainly the task of monetary control faces some very tough hurdles in the year ahead. But those hurdles, the inevitable short-run blips in the money supply, the inevitable second guessing as to why the Fed entered the market at 11:07 a.m. instead of 11:30 a.m., should not be misconstrued. The technicalities, the debate and the dialogue aside, the underlying objective of the exercise has been and, from where I stand, will continue to be achieving rates of growth in money that, over time, are compatible with a sustained reduction in inflation.
To put it simply, they expressed the Fed's decision rules as for mulas. They found that, using standard statistical techniques, they could strongly reject the claim that there has been no change in the way the Fed reacts to developments in the money supply and interest rates. They found that the Fed has indeed been following a new policy. The result of this new policy is that the federal funds rate is more sensitive to changes in the growth of money; it responds both more quickly and more sharply.
I do not mean to suggest that interest rates never enter into the Committee's deliberations. You know, as I do, that the Committee's directives still contain a band on the funds rate-a band that is typically 500 to 600 basis points wide. By and large, however, the band is viewed by the Committee as a reference point for consultations rather than a strict constraint on day-to-day operations as it was in the past. Also, the limits on the funds rate band are looked at in terms of weekly averages rather than limits for individual days or points of time within days. Here too, I believe the record confirms the fact that the Committee is less concerned with interest rates than before. For example, there However, when this occurred, the funds rate band was altered by the Committee.
There were also two occasions-one on the upside and one on the downside-in which market forces brought the funds rate into proximity with the limits of the funds rate band, only to have sharp shifts in economic and financial conditions emerge and re verse the direction of interest rate and money growth patterns before the Fed had to confront directly the question of whether to alter the funds rate limits.
In these two instances, a case can perhaps be made that market forces intervened just in the nick of time, for in the circumstances that prevailed it would have been by no means clear to me that permitting a further rise (or fall) in the funds rate would have been the "right" decision. Fortunately, per haps, we will never know! The particulars of individual episodes aside, I know that some would argue that the mere presence of a funds rate band-no matter how wide and no matter how willing the Committee to alter the limits of the band-constitutes prima facie evidence that no thing has changed. I also know that some observers continue to believe that there is, in some sense, a de facto narrow limit on even daily movements in the funds rate. Having said that, I would hasten to add that I believe that we can improve these techniques and procedures. In the near term, definitional and data problems-in part associated with the implementation of the Monetary Control Act-will further complicate matters. However, once the crunch associated with that process is behind us, universal reserves and reporting of deposits should help, as should the major simplification of the structure of re serve requirements. Similarly, once that initial crunch is behind us, we can take a fresh and unencumbered look at lagged reserve requirements. More fundamentally, perhaps, we now have more than a
year of experience with the new procedures which, in itself, pro vides considerable grist for the analytical mill. That ongoing analysis of experience with the new procedures will, I am confi dent, generate ideas for enhancement and improvement.
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